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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 78-2-2(3)0) (1953), as amended.
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Defendants'

awareness of the TKI acquisition and of Plaintiff s reliance upon Defendants' audit prior
to the completion of the audit, where:
a.

Plaintiff offered evidence that a TKI director sought advice from
Defendants on March 31, 1993, regarding the effects of the
contemplated acquisition;

b.

Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that Defendants'
5

audit was not completed until June 30, 1993; and
c.

Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that Defendants
knew that Plaintiff and its stockholders would be relying upon
Defendants' audit.

Standard of review: On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this
Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and grants them no
deference. Workman v. Brighton Properties. Inc.. 976 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Utah 1999).
2.

Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Plaintiffs

damages where:
a.

Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that Defendants did
not conduct the TKI audit in conformity with generally accepted
accounting procedures and standards; and

b.

Plaintiff offered evidence and expert testimony that the Defendants'
failure to do so caused Plaintiff to realize approximately twohundred fifty-thousand ($250,000.00) dollars less than was
represented by Defendants.

Standard of review: On an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this
Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness and grants them no
deference. Workman v. Brighton Properties. Inc.. 976 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Utah 1999).

6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
1.

A.I.C.P.A. Professional Standards AU §560.10. There is a period after the
balance-sheet date with which the auditor must be concerned in completing
various phases of his audit. This period is known as the "subsequent
period" and is considered to extend to the date of the auditor's report. Its
duration will depend upon the practical requirements of each audit and may
vary from a relatively short period to one of several months. Also, all
auditing procedures are not carried out a t the same time and some phases of
an audit will be performed during the subsequent period, whereas other
phases will be substantially completed on or before the balance-sheet date.
As an audit approaches completion, the auditor will be concentrating on the
unresolved auditing and reporting matters and he is not expected to be
conducting a continuing review of those matters to which he has previously
applied auditing procedures and reached satisfaction.

2.

Generally Accepted Accounting Standards §B05.105, B05.107.
a.

B05.105. For accounting purposes, the term "current assets" is used
to designate cash and other assets or resources commonly identified
as those that are reasonably expected to be realized in cash or sold or
consumed during the normal operating cycle of the business. Thus,
the term comprehends in general such resources as (a) cash available
for current operations and items that are the equivalent of cash; (b)
inventories of merchandise, raw materials, goods in process, finished
goods, operating supplies, and ordinary maintenance material and
parts; (c) trade accounts, notes, and acceptances receivable; (d)
receivables from officers, employees, affiliates, and others, if
collectible in the ordinary course of business within a year; (e)
installment or deferred accounts and notes receivable if they conform
generally to normal trade practices and terms within the business; (f)
marketable securities representing the investment of cash available
for current operations, including investments in debt and equity
securities classified as trading securities under Section 180,
"Investments: Debt and Equity Securities"; and (g) prepaid expenses
such as insurance, interest, rents, taxes, unused royalties, current paid
advertising service not yet received, and operating supplies. Prepaid
expenses are current assets not in the sense that they will be
converted into cash, but in the sense that, if not paid in advance, they
7

would require the use of current assets during the operating cycle.
b.

3.

B05.107. This concept of the nature or current assets contemplates
the exclusion from that classification of such resources as: (a) cash
and claims to cash that are restricted as to withdrawal or use for
other than current operations, are designated for expenditure in the
acquisition or construction of noncurrent assets, or are segregated for
the liquidation of long-term debts; (b) investments in securities
(whether marketable or not) or advances that have been made for the
purposes of control, affiliation, or other continuing business
advantage; (c) receivables arising from unusual transactions (such as
the sale of capital assets, or loans or advances to affiliates, officers,
or employees) that are not expected to be collected within 12
months; (d) cash surrender value of life insurance policies; (e) land
and other natural resources; (f) depreciable assets; and (g) long-term
prepayments that are fairly chargeable to the operations of several
years, or deferred charges such as bonus payments under a long-term
lease, costs of rearrangement of factory layout, or removal to a new
location.

Utah Code Annotated 58-26-12. No person licensed or authorized to
practice under this chapter or any of his employees, partners, members,
officers, or shareholders are liable to persons with whom they are not in
privity of contract for civil damages resulting from acts, omissions,
decisions, or other conduct in connection with professional services
performed by him, except for:
(1)
acts, omissions, decisions, or conduct that constitute fraud or
intentional misrepresentations; or
(2)
other acts omissions, decisions, or conduct, if the person knew that a
primary intent of the client was for the professional services to
benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action; except,
however, for the purposes of this subsection, if the person:
(a)
identified in writing to the client those persons who are
intended to rely on the services; and
(b)
sent a copy of the writing or similar statement to the persons
identified in the writing or statement, then he or any of his
employees, partners, members, officers, or shareholders may
be liable only to the persons intended to rely, in addition to
those persons in privity of contract with him.
8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises from the damages inflicted upon a corporation by an accounting
firm's negligence. The Plaintiff-corporation, having an interest in acquiring the assets of
a third-party company, began an investigation of the company's finances. During the
investigation, the Plaintiff-corporation relied heavily upon an audit of the company's
finances provided by Defendant-accountants. The Defendant-accountants, however, were
negligent in their preparation of the audit, which negligence caused the assets of the
company to appear significantly greater than they really were. The Plaintiff-corporation
proceeded with the acquisition based primarily upon the inflated figures in the audit.
Upon acquiring the assets, however, the Plaintiff-corporation quickly realized that the
assets were much less than anticipated and brought suit against Defendant-accountants for
negligence and negligent misrepresentation.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on
two grounds. First, the trial court found that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that
Defendants' actions had caused any damage to Plaintiff. The significance of this finding
flows from the fact that damages are an essential element of standing as well as
negligence, without which the case could not go forward. Second, the trial court found
that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff s reliance on
9

the audit. The significance of this finding flows from the fact that, under the statutory
privity defense, accountants cannot be held liable for damages caused to a third party by
the type of negligence alleged unless they were aware that the third party would be
relying on the audit. Thus, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to
two elements essential to Plaintiffs claim, and that Defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law as to those elements, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs suit. Plaintiff
appeals the grant of summary judgment to Defendants.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Citing to Record Index ("R ")
The parties to the case
1.

Plaintiff, PAPERWISE, fka TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION, INC.

("TKA"), is a Texas corporation with its registered office in Dallas County, Texas, and its
principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiffs Complaint §1, Rl;
Defendants' Answer §1, R17.
2.

Defendant, JONES JENSEN ORTON & COMPANY ("JJOC"), is an

organization of certified public accountants that forms a Utah general partnership, has at
least one general partner who is a Utah resident, and has its principal place of business at
349 South 200 East, Suite 500, Salt Lake City. Plaintiffs Complaint §2, R2; Defendants'
Answer §2, 7,R17-18.
3.

On information and belief, Defendant ROBERT GORDON JONES

10

("Jones") was the JJOC partner who signed the balance sheets, financial statements, and
the Auditor's Report, having participated in the drafting, editing, and reviewing of the
audit documents relevant to this lawsuit. Jones 1994 Depo., p24, 26-30, 33-36, 41-42.
4.

In any event, Jones has admitted in deposition testimony that he was the

JJOC partner in charge of the relevant audit. Jones 1994 depo., R964.
Techknowlogy, Inc. ("TKI") hires Defendants
5.

Beginning in 1989, Defendants were hired by Techknowlogy, Inc. ("TKI"),

a Utah company engaged in the production and marketing of specialized software
products, to audit TKI's financial records on an annual basis. Defendants' Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §1, R860; Jones 1994 depo, R955;
Plaintiffs Complaint §6-7, R2; Defendants' Answer §6-7, R17-18.
The TAP account receivable is created
6.

At some point during the 1993fiscalyear, TKI loaned approximately

$250,000 to a company known as Techknowlogy Asian Pacific ("TAP"). Defendants'
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R94, 860.
7.

There is no evidence in either JJOC's working papers or the Master

Distributor's Agreement to suggest that an actual promissory note or other binding
document ever existed to evidence and enforce TAP's repayment obligation. Bramble
Second Affidavit §12, R239.
8.

The nature of the transaction gives rise to several limitations on TAP's
11

repayment obligation that distinguishes it from a legally enforceable debt: (1) the
obligation imposed no personal liability on the obligor, (2) the obligation did not bear
interest, (3) the obligation could be canceled at any time if the Master Distribution
Agreement was terminated, and (4) the obligation was contingent upon and would only be
paid out of a five-percent royalty on future sales. Bramble Second Affidavit §9, R238239; Master Distributor Agreement §31, R257-258.
Plaintiff TKA is incorporated and organized in May 1993
9.

In May 1993, TKA was incorporated and organized for the purpose of

acquiring the assets of TKI as well as succeeding to its business. Defendants'
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §12, R862, Plaintiffs
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment §1, R1022.
Defendants begin to issue the TKI audit materials on May 17,1993
10.

Defendants first issued TKI audit materials on May 17,1993. Defendants'

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §4, R860.
11.

Plaintiff entered evidence, including expert testimony, that the May 17 audit

materials, which included TKFs balance sheets but no financial documents or auditor's
report, were neither complete nor final. Bramble First Affidavit §3-13, R984-988.
12.

Plaintiff entered evidence, including expert testimony, that AICPA

Professional Standards require a "subsequent period" following the issuing of balance
sheets to allow the accountants to "perform certain audit procedures for transactions or
12

events occurring after the balance-sheet date." Bramble First Affidavit §8, R985, quoting
AICPA Professional Standards AU §560.10, R315.
13.

Defendants subsequently made various additions and alterations to the audit

on numerous occasions for the purpose of updating the audit in conformity with AICPA
Professional Standards. Bramble First Affidavit §3, 10, 12-13, R984-988.
Defendants learn of the proposed acquisition during the "subsequent period"
14.

Plaintiff entered evidence that Defendants were already aware of the

proposed merger at the time the first audit materials were issued on May 17, 1993.
Plaintiffs Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, R1023; Jones 1994 Depo., R959.
15.

Defendants entered evidence that they did not learn of the proposed

acquisition until after May 17, 1993. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment §7,
R861.
16.

Plaintiff entered evidence that, in any event, Defendants learned of the

proposed acquisition no later than May 28, 1993. Plaintiffs Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment, R1023; Jones 1994 Depo., R958.
17.

Defendants' knowledge and awareness of the proposed acquisition is

reflected in footnote 11 in the audit report, which was entered into the report on June 30,
1993, under the signature of Defendant JONES. Auditor's Report, footnote 11, R316317.
18.

The substance of footnote 11 also evidences that Defendants knew that TKI
13

intended to benefit Plaintiff by having Defendants perform the audit. Bramble Third
Affidavit §4, 7, Rl066-1067.
Defendants complete the TKI audit on June 30,1993
19.

Plaintiff entered evidence, including expert testimony, that the audit could

not have been completed earlier than June 30, 1993, the date the Auditor's Report was
issued in complete form. Bramble First Affidavit §3, 6, R984-985.
All versions of the TKI audit contained the same misclassification of the TAP
account receivable
20.

In all versions of the TKI audit, Defendants listed the TAP obligation as an

account receivable in the category of "current assets" in the amount of $251,509.00. TKI
Balance Sheets, R102; Bramble Second Affidavit §4, R237.
21.

Generally Accepted Accounting Standards ("GAAS") define "current

assets" as cash and other assets or resources that are reasonably expected to be realized in
cash or sold or consumed during the "normal operating cycle of business." Bramble
Second Affidavit §8, R238; GAAS B05.105, R263-264.
22.

An "operating cycle", which is defined as the average time intervening

between the acquisition of materials or services and the final cash realization from the
sale of products or services, is generally presumed to be 12 months. Bramble Second
Affidavit §8, R238; GAAS B05.107, R264-265.
23.

An account receivable may not be listed as a "current asset" if collection is
14

not expected within twelve months. Bramble Second Affidavit §8, R238; GAAS,
B05.107,R264-265.
24.

The repayment schedule for the TAP obligation, which extended over the

ten-year period from 1993 to 2003, provided that only $3,750.00 of the total obligation
would be paid back in the first twelve months. Bramble Second Affidavit § 13, R239-240;
Master Distributor Agreement §31.3, R258.
25.

The remaining $246,250.00 balance could not properly be classified as a

"current asset" because collection was not expected within the first twelve-month period.
Bramble Second Affidavit §13, R988; GAAS, B05.107, R264-265.
26.

Thus, Defendants' classification of the TAP obligation as a "current asset"

was not in conformity with either Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures ("GAAP")
or Generally Accepted Accounting Standards ("GAAS"). Bramble Second Affidavit §6,
12-44, R236, 239-246.
The misclassification of the TAP obligation is significant and material
27.

This misclassification resulted in a significant overstatement of TKI's

assets, as the TAP obligation of $251,509.00 represented a 21.2 percent increase in the
total $1,186,943.00 current assets listed. Bramble Second Affidavit §21, R241.
28.

The TAP obligation also represented 27.6 percent of the total $910,450.00

accounts receivable listed, and 18.6 percent of the $1,351,736.00 total assets listed.
Bramble Second Affidavit §21, R241.
15

Relying upon the erroneous information, Plaintiff proceeds with the acquisition of
TKTs assets
29.

Plaintiffs acquisition of TKTs assets was executed in accordance with the

Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum dated July 23, 1993, and the Asset
Acquisition Agreement dated August 16, 1993, and the General Conveyance executed in
connection with the Asset Acquisition Agreement. Defendants' Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment §13, R862; Plaintiffs Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment, R1029.
30.

Under the agreements, Plaintiff agreed to issue additional shares of its stock

to the officers and shareholders of TKI in exchange for TKTs assets. Defendants'
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment §14, R862-863.
31.

Under the agreements, TKI was obligated to transfer "all accounts

receivable of TKI and all other rights of TKI to Payment for goods sold or leased or for
services rendered, including without limitation those which are not evidenced by
instruments or chattel paper, whether or not they have been earned by performance or
have been written off or reserved against as a bad debt or doubtful account in any
Financial Statements" in return for the stock. General Conveyance §1(8), R502.
Plaintiff was damaged by the misclassiflcation
32.

As a result of Defendants' failure to adhere to GAAP and GAAS, Plaintiffs

acquired assets from TKI that were $251,509.00 less than reasonably expected. Bramble
16

Second Affidavit §43-44, R246; Bramble Third Affidavit §8-9, R1068-1069.
Plaintiff files suit against Defendants
33.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants for negligence and negligent

misrepresentation. Plaintiffs Complaint, Rl.
34.

Defendants entered a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Plaintiff

could not adequately demonstrate either that it had been damaged or that Defendants were
aware that Plaintiff would be relying upon the TKI audit in contemplation of the
acquisition. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, R81, 854.
35.

The trial court granted the Defendants' motion on both grounds. Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Rl 100; Order of Summary Judgment, Rl 108.
3 6.

Plaintiff now appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate only where all of the pleadings, evidence,
admissions, and inferences therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving
party, show that: (1) no genuine issues of material fact exist, and (2) the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d 980 (Utah 1972).
Plaintiffs appeal is based in its belief that the trial court erred in concluding that no
genuine issues of material fact exist as to either Defendants' awareness of Plaintiff s
reliance or to Plaintiffs damages.
There is no question that Plaintiff properly submitted evidence, including expert
17

opinion, that Defendants knew that Plaintiff would be relying on the TKI audit in
contemplation of acquiring TKI's assets. This is sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact. Well-settled summary judgment principles establish that Plaintiff does not
have to do anything more to meet its burden. In order for the non-moving party to
successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it
is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the nonmoving party to show facts controverting the facts stated in the moving party's affidavit.
Similarly, there is no question that Plaintiff properly submitted evidence, including
expert opinion, that Defendants' negligence caused Plaintiff to suffer damages. This is
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Well-settled summary judgment
principles establish that Plaintiff does not have to do anything more to meet its burden. In
order for the non-moving party to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment
and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal
theory; it is only necessary for the non-moving party to show facts controverting the facts
stated in the moving party's affidavit.
All the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, viewed in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff, show that genuine issues of material fact do exist. The
trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant should therefore
be reversed.

18

ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants because genuine
issues of material fact exist with respect to both Plaintiffs damages and Defendant's
awareness of the subject acquisition.
Point I:

Summary judgment is inappropriate because Plaintiff has submitted
evidence, including expert opinion, that the Defendant did not complete
the audit until June 30,1993, giving rise to a genuine dispute over
whether Defendants were aware of Plaintiff s reliance prior to
completion of the audit that must be resolved as a question of fact.

The requirements of the summary judgment procedure, set forth in Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are well settled. "To sustain a summary judgment, the
pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the
[non-moving] party, must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the
[moving] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Judkins v. Toone, 492 P.2d
980 (Utah 1972). "Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, that the [nonmoving] party could win if given a trial." Id. A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the
basis of the facts in the record in a case such as this, reasonable minds could differ on
whether defendant's conduct measures up to the required standard. Jackson v. Dabnev,
645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). "If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, the
motion should be denied." Ruffmengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978). "Even if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, a summary judgment is proper only if the
pleadings and other documents demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 P.2d 678 (Utah 1982). "In
19

order for the non-moving party to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment
and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal
theory; it is only necessary for the non-moving party to show facts controverting the facts
stated in the moving party's affidavit." Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc.,
761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Even "where the parties were not in complete conflict
as to certain facts, but the understanding, intention, and consequences of those facts were
vigorously disputed, the matter was not proper for summary judgment and could only be
resolved by a trial." Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). "Negligence cases
often require the drawing of inferences from facts, which is properly done by juries rather
than judges." Trujillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
(quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 191 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996). "Summary judgment
is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Trujillo v. Utah Dep't
ofTransp., 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Moreover, "trial courts must avoid
weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on summary judgment." Id.
As applied to the instant case, the above body of law provides support for
summary judgment in favor of Defendants only if the pleadings, evidence, admissions,
and inferences therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, show that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
The issue of Defendants' awareness is material to Plaintiffs claim because, as per
20

the statutory privity defense, an accountant cannot be held liable to a third party for the
type of negligence alleged unless the accountant knew that his client intended the
accountant's services to benefit the third party. U.C.A. 58-26-12. In other words, the
statutory privity defense protects Defendants from Plaintiffs claim if it is demonstrated
that Defendants were unaware that Plaintiff would be relying on the subject audit in its
dealings with TKI. Inversely, Defendants would be unable to raise the defense if it was
demonstrated that they were aware that Plaintiff was intended to rely on the audit in
contemplation of the acquisition. Thus, as resolution of this issue determines whether
Plaintiffs claim may go forward, evidence relating to whether and when Defendants
became aware of Plaintiff s reliance is clearly material.
Plaintiff, in opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, properly
submitted evidence that included expert opinion in support of its argument that
Defendants were aware that Plaintiff would be relying on the TKI audit in contemplation
of acquiring TKI's assets prior to completion of the audit. Specifically, Plaintiff
submitted evidence that a TKI director sought advice from Defendants JJOC on March
31, 1993, as to the effects of the contemplated transaction. Plaintiffs Response to
Motion for Summary Judgment, R1023; Jones 1994 Depo., R959. More importantly,
Plaintiff submitted expert testimony that the audit itself, particularly footnote 11,
evidences that Defendants knew that TKI intended to benefit Plaintiff by having
Defendants perform the audit. Bramble Third Affidavit §4, 7, R1066-1067. This
21

evidence and testimony directly contradicts Defendants' assertions that they knew
nothing of the proposed acquisition prior to May 17, 1993. The fact that both parties have
entered contradictory evidence relating to a relevant issue gives rise to a genuine issue of
material fact that precludes summary judgment. The well-settled summary judgment
principles discussed in Part I establish that Plaintiff does not have to do anything more to
meet its burden. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) "In order for the non-moving party to successfully oppose a motion for
summary judgment and send the issue to a fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to
prove its legal theory; it is only necessary for the non-moving party to show facts
controverting the facts stated in the moving party's affidavit." Id. The presence of such a
factual dispute precludes entry of summary judgment. Id.
In addition to record evidence, Plaintiff has also submitted the expert testimony of
Curtis Bramble, a certified public accountant for over fifteen years and a member of an
accountant review board that assists the Department of Professional Licensing, for the
purpose of establishing that Defendants could not have completed the TKI audit earlier
than June 30, 1993. Bramble First Affidavit §3, 6, R984-985. This testimony directly
contradicts Defendants' assertions that they completed the audit on May 17, 1993. This
testimony is also buttressed by the undisputed fact that Defendants did, indeed, continue
to make alterations and revisions to the audit documents after May 17 all the way through
June 30, 1993. Well-settled summary judgment principles establish that it is improper for
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a court to weigh evidence and assess credibility, as the trial court has apparently done
here. Truiillo v. Utah Dep't of Transp.. 986 P.2d 752 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "Trial courts
must avoid weighing evidence and assessing credibility when ruling on summary
judgment." Id. Thus, Bramble's testimony may not simply be disregarded; the court
must accord consideration to his testimony at least equal to that extended to Defendants'
evidence.
Thus, Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of factual disputes relating to
whether Defendant was aware, prior to completion of the TKI audit, that Plaintiff would
subsequently be relying upon the audit in contemplation of acquiring TKI's assets. One
dispute is over the exact date Defendants became aware of the contemplated acquisition.
The other dispute is over the exact date the audit was completed. As these are clearly
questions of fact that are most properly resolved by a fact-finder, the summary judgment
in favor of Defendants must be reversed.
Point II:

Summary judgment in inappropriate because Plaintiff has submitted
evidence, including expert opinion, that it was damaged by the
negligent misclassification of the TAP account, giving rise to a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was damaged.

The issue of Plaintiff s damages is material in terms of both standing and prima
facie negligence. Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 3 P.3d 722 (Utah Ct. App.
2000) (to have standing sufficient to seek damages, a plaintiff "must be able to show that
he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury"); J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d
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115 (Utah 1992) ("a negligence claim requires a showing of the suffering of damages by
the plaintiff). Thus, as resolution of this issue determines whether Plaintiffs claim may
go forward, evidence relating to whether Plaintiff suffered damage as a result of
Defendants' acts is clearly material.
Plaintiff, in opposing Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, properly
submitted evidence that included expert opinion in support of its argument that Plaintiff
suffered damages as a result of Defendants' acts. Specifically, Plaintiff entered affidavits
by Curtis Bramble stating, in essence, that "Defendants [falsely] declared more receivable
or net income be classifying expenses as a receivable rather than an expense." Bramble
Third Affidavit §8-9, R1068-1069. This caused Plaintiff to suffer "damages relative to
misrepresentation of assets via the TAP account receivable." Bramble Third Affidavit
§8-9, Rl068-1069. Put simply, Defendants' negligent misstatement deceived Plaintiff
into purchasing something worth a quarter of a million dollars less than represented.
There can be no question that this caused Plaintiff to suffer damages. Damages exist
where one has deprived another of the use and control of the other's own assets.
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Common sense yields a similar
result; even one unschooled in the law must know that he cannot lie about the value of his
wares and go unpunished if he is caught. Indeed, the well-established crime of false
advertising is perfectly analogous to the instant situation. Furthermore, Defendants'
negligence severely prejudiced Plaintiffs good faith attempt to succeed to TKI's business
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by leaving Plaintiff with approximately $250,000 less than planned. Considering the
facts and evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is simply unreasonable to
argue that Plaintiff has not done enough to send the issue of damages to a fact-finder to
decide.
Defendants make additional points in their effort to demonstrate that their
negligence did not harm Plaintiff. One point is that Plaintiff could not have been
damaged because the TAP account receivable was never actually transferred to Plaintiff.
This argument is nonsensical and ultimately irrelevant to the issue of whether Plaintiff
suffered damages. Assuming for a moment that the TAP account receivable was never
transferred to Plaintiff, it would have remained in the control of TKI. This is, in fact,
precisely what Defendants allege actually occurred; Defendants allege that it was held
back for the purpose of covering certain expenses and liabilities incurred by TKI. Such
an occurrence would be no less harmful to Plaintiff than if the Plaintiff had actually
received the TAP obligation masquerading as an asset. The bottom line is that Plaintiff
did not receive the $251,509.00 asset it reasonably expected to receive based on
Defendants' audit. Plaintiffs expectation that it would receive the TAP account
receivable was certainly reasonable considering that language of the General
Conveyance, which provided that Plaintiff would receive:
all accounts receivable of TKI and all other rights of TKI to Payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered, including without limitation those which
are not evidenced by instruments or chattel paper, whether or not they have been
earned by performance or have been written off or reserved against as a bad debt
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or doubtful account in any Financial Statements.
General Conveyance §1(8), R502 (emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiff had a right to all
account receivables listed in Defendants' balance sheets, including the TAP account
receivable. Regardless of whether Plaintiff did not receive it because TKI held it back or
because it was not what the audit purported it to be, the end result would be the same:
Plaintiff did not receive the $251,509.00 asset it reasonably and rightfully expected to
receive. Plaintiff further supported this proposition with expert testimony. Bramble
Third Affidavit §8-9, R106801069. Thus, the issue of whether the TAP account
receivable was actually transferred to Plaintiff has no bearing on the question of damages
and is immaterial.
Another point Defendants try to make is that Plaintiff suffered no losses because
the only consideration ever paid for the acquired assets was stock in TKA. This is an
enigmatic statement to say the least, because there is no question that corporate stock,
which the officers and shareholders of TKI received via the acquisition, clearly has
economic value. Defendants seemingly would take the position that TKI was amenable
to simply giving away its assets while knowing that it would receive nothing in return.
This is hardly realistic. Defendant cannot reasonably make the argument that a situation
where two parties exchange assets for stock is identical to a situation where one party
gives all of its assets to the other without any compensation. The facts are clear: Plaintiff
gave the officers and shareholders of TKI stock in TKA in consideration for the TKI
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assets it acquired, and the TKI officers and shareholders saw the stock as valuable
consideration commensurate with the assets it transferred. Indeed, these facts suggest that
the Defendants' proposition is unlikely. It must also be noted that Defendants fail to cite
to a single on-point example in support of this proposition. As Plaintiff has met
Defendants' questionable damages claim with expert testimony that Plaintiff did, indeed,
suffer damages, it must be found that genuine issues of material fact exist which preclude
summary judgment. The grant of summary judgment to Defendants must be reversed.
Point III:

Summary judgment is inappropriate because Defendants have failed to
meet the standard of showing a "clear instance" of appropriateness.

Finally, Utah courts generally recognize that "negligence cases often require the
drawing of inferences from facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges."
Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App. 277 (Utah Ct. App. 2001). The rule that
flows from this analysis is that "summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases
only in the clearest instances." Id. It cannot realistically be argued that summary
judgment is clearly appropriate in the instant case. Plaintiff has not simply rested on its
allegations, but instead has properly entered substantial evidence and expert testimony
that contradicts the facts asserted by the moving party. As the non-moving party is
entitled to the most favorable light, it must be found that Plaintiff has demonstrated the
existence of genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
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CONCLUSION
Because genuine issues of material fact exist, summary judgment is inappropriate
and must not be granted to Defendants.
In sum, the trial court erred in holding that no genuine issues of material fact exist
with respect to Defendants' awareness of the acquisition and Plaintiffs reliance, and to
Plaintiffs damages. Viewing all pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that genuine issues of material
fact exist with respect to Defendants' awareness of Plaintiff s reliance and to Plaintiffs
damages. Moreover, there is a general tendency to avoid summary judgment in
negligence cases like the instant case. The trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Defendants should therefore be reversed.
DATED this < J
day of May, 2002.

L^
MICHAEL J. PETRO
Young, Kester & Petro
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844
RANDLE, DEAMER, MCCONKIE & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple, #330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169
Telephone: (801)531-0441
Fax: (801) 531-0444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAPERWISE, INC., fka
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON &
COMPANY, a Utah partnership,
and ROBERT GORDON JONES, an
individual,
Defendants.
JONES, JENSEN & COMPANY,
fka JONES, JENSEN, ORTON &
COMPANY,
Third Party Plaintiff,

:
:
:

:
:

Civil No. 960905873-CV

:

Judge Ronald E. Nehring

:

:

v.
LARRY EDWARDS and MARY BETH
EDWARDS, TECHKNOWLOGY, INC., :
a corporation, and its successors in
interest, STEVEN CHRISTENSEN and
WINSTON LEE, individuals,
Third Party Defendants.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Based upon the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law entered concurrently herewith,
and good cause appearing, now therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants Jones,
Jensen, Orton and Company and Robert Gordon Jones' Motion for Summary Judgment be and the
same is hereby granted and the above-entitled action is dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
No attorneys' fees are awarded and costs in the amount of $

is hereby awarded

to Defendants JJOC as against Plaintiff Paperwise.
JJOC's Third Party Complaint is hereby voluntarily withdrawn and dismissed pursuant to
Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, each party to bear its own attorneys fees, court
costs and expenses.
DATED this

day of

, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Ronald E. Nehnng
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Michael J. Petro
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Michael L. Deamer
Attorneys for Defendants

-> N. Hoole
s for Third Party Defendants
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MICHAEL L. DEAMER - NO. 844
RANDLE, DEAMER, MCCONKIE & LEE, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants
139 East South Temple, #330
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1169
Telephone: (801) 531-0441
Fax: (801)531-0444

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAPERWISE, INC.,fka
TECHKNOWLOGY ACQUISITION,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JONES, JENSEN, ORTON &
COMPANY, a Utah partnership,
and ROBERT GORDON JONES, an
individual,
Defendants.
JONES, JENSEN & COMPANY,
fka JONES, JENSEN, ORTON &
COMPANY,
Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
LARRY EDWARDS and MARY BETH
EDWARDS, TECHKNOWLOGY, INC.,
a corporation, and its successors in
interest. STEVEN CHRISTENSEN and
WINSTON LEE, individuals,
Third Partv Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 960905873-CV
Judge Ronald E. Nehring

The motion of Defendants Jones, Jensen, Orton and Company and Robert Gordon Jones,
(hereinafter "JJOC") for summary judgment came on for hearing before the above-entitled court,
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, District Court Judge presiding, on Monday, August 27, 2001,
at the courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah with Michael J. Petro, Esq. appearing on behalf of
Plaintiff, Michael L. Deamer, Esq. appearing on behalf of JJOC and Gregory N. Hoole appearing
on behalf of Third Party Defendants and the court having reviewed the memorandums of law, and
affidavits and having heai'd argument of counsel and being fully advised in the premises now
enters its
FINDINGS OF FACTS
1.

Techknowlogy, Inc. (herein "TKI") retained JJOC to perform its routine annual

year-end audit for the period ending March 31, 1993. No other entity hired JJOC to perform said
audit nor did any entity at any time pay for the audit services performed.
2.

TKI did not hire JJOC to perform an audit in connection with a proposed Asset

Acquisition Agreement with Plaintiff or with any entity known as Newco, Charles Pace or any
other entity or individual from Texas.
3.

Plaintiff has submitted no admissible evidence or proof of any kind that JJOC or

any of its officers, agents or employees had any knowledge of a proposed sale of TKI's assets to
Plaintiff prior to the completion of their audit field work on May 3, 1993 and the issuance of their
written audit report on May 17, 1993.
4.

In fact, there was substantial testimony that there was no deal in Texas at the time

JJOCs audit report was issued and that TKI was in the process of raising money. Larry Edwards,
i

the president of TKI testified that he did not even tell JJOC they would be using their March 31,
1993 audit report in a proposed Private Placement Memorandum of Plaintiffs'.
5.

The disputed portion of JJOC's audit report centers on an account receivable from

a subsidiary company known as Techknowlogy Asia Pacific ("TAP") to which entity TKI lent
some $250,000.00 for the payment of rent, utilities and the purchase of office furnishings.
During the course of the audit, JJOC sent a positive written confirmation to TAP and received a
signed contract from TAP memorializing the obligation of TAP to reimburse TKI for $250,000.00
and additionally verified the existence of cancelled checks totaling at least $250,000.00 evidencing
actual payments by TKI.
6.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the TAP account receivable was transferred

to Plaintiff as part of the Asset Acquisition Agreement and in fact, Steve Christensen, vicepresident and director of TKI would testified that the TAP account receivable was not transferred
to Plaintiff.
7.

JJOC's audit report was issued on May 17, 1993 with a date of May 3, 1993, and

concluded that TKI was "not a going concern" because it lost over $533,000.00 in 1991 from
operations, $1.8 million in 1992 and $533,000.00 as of March 31, 1993.
8.

JJOC first learned of the proposed transfer of some of the assets to a group in Texas

after the issuance of their audit report on May 17, 1993. As a result thereof, JJOC on June 30,
1993, added a footnote 11 to the audit report, which footnote is dated June 30, 1993, disclosing
a proposed sale of some of TKI's assets to a corporation in Texas.

•>
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9.

Plaintiff Paperwise (formerly known as Techknowlogy Acquisition, Inc.) was a

corporation formed in May, 1993 in Texas for the sole purpose of purchasing some (but not all)
of the assets of TKI. Pursuant to a Confidential Limited Offering Memorandum dated July 23,
1993, Paperwise issued stock to the public for cash in July 1993.
10.

On August 16, 1993, TKI and Paperwise entered into an Asset Acquisition

Agreement whereby Paperwise agreed to issue additional shares of its stock to the individual
shareholders of TKI in return for a transfer of some (but not all) of the assets of TKI.
11.

Approximately $659,000.00 in accounts receivables and miscellaneous assets were

retained by TKI to pay IRS taxes, the Kissane and Woodbridge claims and other scheduled
liabilities.
12.

After the consummation of the Asset Acquisition Agreement between Paperwise

and TKI on August 16, 1993, the former officers and directors of TKI became employees of
Paperwise until they were terminated for cause variously in January of 1994 through June of 1994.
13.

When Plaintiff terminated the employment of the former TKI officers and directors

it cancelled all of Paperwise stock issued to said individuals, in effect rescinding the Asset
Acquisition Agreement of August 16, 1993, but did not return any of the assets of TKI to its
former owners or to TKI.
14.

Paperwise gave no other property, monies or consideration for the assets of TKI

other than stock in Paperwise which it subsequently cancelled and rescinded within six to nine
months after issuance.
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15.

In September 1996, more than three years after the Asset Acquisition Agreement,

Paperwise failed and filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Dallas, Texas.
16.

Plaintiff Paperwise has offered no proof of any other damages suffered other than

the bankruptcy of Paperwise in 1996.
17.

Plaintiff Paperwise has offered no evidence or proof that the TAP account

receivable was actually transferred to Paperwise as part of the asset acquisition transaction with
TKI.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The court hereby enters the following conclusions of law:
1.

U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) limits the liability of persons providing accounting

services to those with whom the accountant is in privity. Under the statute, privity may extend
beyond the client for whom services are provided "if the person knew that a primary intent of the
client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the
action...".
2.

There is no competent evidence in the record or submitted by Plaintiff that JJOC

knew of the proposed asset sale or the identity of the proposed purchaser of TKTs diSStts as of
May 17, 1993, the date when the audit opinion was issued, hence the privity statute does not
extend to Paperwise.
3.

Extending all favorable inferences that can reasonably be drawn from the facts and

the record, JJOC is entitled to the privity protection of U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) as each of the
statutory elements appear from the record to ha\ • been met.
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4.

Plaintiffs contention that JJOC knew that TKI was cash strapped and seeking to

raise money in advance of issuing its audit report is insufficient to extend JJOC's statutory privity
protection as such an interpretation would imperil any accountant who undertook to perform
services for an otherwise insolvent or thinly capitalized company. This is not the intention of the
privity statute.
5.

The addition of Footnote 11 dated June 30, 1993 does not broaden or extend the

privity protection of U.C.A. §58-26-12 (1990) based on the interpretation of the statute regarding
"influencing a particular person" used in U.C.A. §58-26-12(2).
6.

The addition of Footnote 11 dated June 30, 1993 by JJOC was reasonable under

Professional Accounting Standards SAS (Statement of Accountant Standards) No. 1, AU §561
regarding an accountant's duty upon discovery of a subsequent event that may materially affect
the financial statements.
7.

There is no evidence in the record that would support a finding that Plaintiff

suffered any damage as a result of JJOC's conduct.
8.

Paperwise effectively rescinded the Asset Acquisition Agreement dated August 16,

1993 with TKI upon cancellation of stock issued in consideration of the sale of those assets, but
failed to return any assets to TKI or its previous shareholders. As such, Paperwise suffered no
damages.
9.

In the absence of any damages, any causes of action alleged by Paperwise must fail.
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10.

Plaintiffs claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are denied and

3efendant JJOC is entitled to summary judgment in its favor as against Plaintiff Paperwise on all
Paperwise claims.
11.

Upon the grant of summary judgment in JJOC's favor as against Plaintiff

Paperwise, JJOC may voluntarily withdraw its Third Party Complaint against Defendants Larry
Edward and Mary Beth Edwards, Techknowlogy, Inc., Steven Christensen and Winston Lee.
DATED this

day of

, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

Honorable Ronald E. Nehring
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

Michael J. Petro
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Michael L. Deamer
Attorneys for Defendants

Gregory N. Hoole
Attorneys for Third Party Defendants
5cqmld/568
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